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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Wayne D. Anderson, II, appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition.    
 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
 
In February 2012, pursuant to an agreement with the state, Anderson 
entered an Alford1 plea to one count of lewd conduct with a minor.  (See 
R., pp.65-70.)  Prior to sentencing, Anderson moved to withdraw the plea on the 
ground that his wife coerced him into pleading guilty.  (See R., pp.44-48.)  The 
district court denied the motion, as well as Anderson’s motion for reconsideration.  
(Id.); State v. Anderson, 156 Idaho 230, 232-233, 322 P.3d 312, 314-315 
(Ct. App. 2014).  The court then imposed a unified 40-year sentence with 15 
years fixed.  (R., pp.49-50.)  On direct appeal, Anderson alleged that his 
sentence was excessive and that the district court erred by denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  Anderson, 156 Idaho at 233-237, 322 P.3d at 315-319.  
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the determinations of the district court.  Id.  
In April 2015, Anderson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.  
(R., pp.4-15.)  Anderson alleged that this trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
present certain evidence regarding Anderson’s mental health issues to the 
district court prior to the entry of his guilty plea, and in support of the subsequent 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  (Id.)  The district court granted Anderson’s 
                                            
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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motion for appointment of counsel to represent him in the post-conviction 
proceeding.  (R., pp.27-28.) 
On July 29, 2015, the district court entered its notice of intent to dismiss 
the post-conviction petition on the ground that Anderson failed to allege facts 
which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief on any of his post-conviction 
claims.  (R., pp.80-91.)  Pursuant to the notice, Anderson had until August 14, 
2015, to respond with an amended petition or additional evidence.  (R., p.90.)  
After the court granted two requests from Anderson’s counsel to extend the time 
to respond, Anderson’s response became due on October 10, 2015.  (R., pp.92-
96, 99-103.)  In his two motions for extensions of time, Anderson’s counsel 
represented to the court that he had reviewed the underlying criminal file, met 
with Anderson’s trial counsel, communicated with staff at the Canyon County Jail 
about obtaining records regarding Anderson’s mental health and behavior while 
incarcerated, communicated with Anderson about the evidentiary hurdles facing 
his post-conviction claims, and initiated an investigation of potential witnesses.  
(R., pp.93,100.) 
On October 14, 2015, Anderson filed pro se motions requesting an 
additional continuance so he could discharge his appointed counsel, represent 
himself, and file an amended pro se petition.  (R., pp.104-105.)  In the motion, 
Anderson asserted that his post-conviction counsel had provided ineffective 
assistance.  (Id.)  At a status conference held on October 19, 2015, the district 
court considered the pro se motions filed by Anderson.  (Tr., p.3, Ls.5-9.)  
Anderson’s counsel represented to the court that his investigator had followed up 
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with the potential witnesses identified to him by Anderson, but that he was unable 
to obtain evidence sufficient to support an amended post-conviction petition.  
(Tr., p.3, Ls.14-18.)  Therefore, Anderson’s counsel continued, he would not be 
filing an amended petition.  (Tr., p.3, Ls.19-25.)   
The district court denied Anderson’s pro se motions.  (R., pp.108-109; 
Tr., p.4, Ls.1-7.)  The court concluded that Anderson had not provided any facts 
to warrant a third extension of time.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.1-3.)  The court further 
concluded that because Anderson had no constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel, Anderson’s assertion of ineffective 
assistance was not a valid basis upon which to grant his motions.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.4-
7.)  The district court then summarily dismissed the post-conviction petition on 
the grounds previously set forth in its notice of intent to dismiss.  (R., pp.110-121; 











 Anderson states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Anderson’s motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss 
court-appointed counsel, and extend his time to prepare an 
amended petition?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Anderson failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motions for a third extension of time to respond to the notice of intent 



































Anderson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Motions For A Third Extension Of Time To Respond To The Notice 
Of Intent To Dismiss, To Discharge His Counsel, And To Proceed Pro Se 
 
A. Introduction 
Anderson contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
several pro se motions he filed prior to the summary dismissal of his post-
conviction petition.  (See generally Appellant’s brief.)  Specifically, Anderson 
contends that the district court erred in failing to continue the post-conviction 
proceeding a third time to allow Anderson to discharge his appointed counsel, 
represent himself, and file an amended pro se post-conviction petition.  (Id.)  
Anderson’s arguments fail because he had no constitutional or statutory right to 
self-representation in a post-conviction proceeding, and because the district court 
acted well within its discretion in declining to further delay the case where 
Anderson had provided no valid basis to do so.      
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies 
within the discretion of the district court.  Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 
792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004).  For the reasons discussed below, the state 
submits that it is likewise a matter of the district court’s discretion whether to 
permit a post-conviction petitioner to discharge his counsel and proceed pro se 
after counsel has been appointed.  See Leonard v. State, 461 N.W.2d 465, 468 
(Iowa 1990) (“Discretion to deny counsel [in a post-conviction proceeding], we 
think, necessarily implies discretion to deny dispensing with counsel.”)   
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Decisions relating to whether to grant a party’s motion for a continuance 
are also within the discretion of the court.  State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 574, 
569 P.2d 916, 919 (1977).   
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Denying Anderson’s 
Pro Se Motions 
 
In a post-conviction proceeding, the decision to grant or deny a motion for 
a continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court.  Hall v. State, 
156 Idaho 125, 131, 320 P.3d 1284, 1290 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Payne, 
146 Idaho 548, 567, 199 P.3d 123, 142 (2008); State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 
106, 967 P.2d 702, 720 (1998)).  In order to prevail on appeal, the petitioner must 
show that the trial court abused its discretion and that his substantial rights have 
been prejudiced.  Id.  (citing Payne, 146 Idaho at 567, 199 P.3d at 142.) 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right of self-representation which 
derives from the Sixth Amendment.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 
(1975).  However, this right of self-representation does not extend to either direct 
appeals or post-conviction proceedings.  See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 
Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (a defendant has no 
constitutional right of self-representation in a direct appeal of a criminal 
conviction); Isom v. State, 953 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (the 
post-conviction court has discretion as to whether to discharge appointed post-
conviction counsel); In re Jerry Chapman, 581 A.2d 1041, 1043-1044 (Vt. 1990) 
(constitutional right to self-representation is inapplicable in post-conviction relief 
proceeding); Bittick v. State, 105 S.W.3d 498, 501 (Mo. App. 2003)  (“The [United 
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States] Supreme Court has not determined whether an incarcerated 
postconviction motion civil litigant has the same right to self-representation” 
(footnote omitted).). 
Further, while some states and the federal government provide for a right 
of self-representation in collateral proceedings through state constitutions and 
statutes (see, e.g., Smith v. Baptiste, 694 S.E.2d 83, 91 (Ga. 2010) (“Even today 
the right of self-representation in federal civil cases is protected only by statute” 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654) (emphasis in original); McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 
85, 90-91 (Alaska 1974) (holding that the Alaska constitution guarantees a right 
to self-representation in a post-conviction proceeding), the Idaho appellate courts 
have not recognized such a state constitutional or statutory right to self-
representation in Idaho post-conviction proceedings. 
To the extent, as Anderson asserts on appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11), 
that there is a common law right to self-representation in Idaho civil cases,2 the 
state submits that this right, even if it applies to convicted criminal defendants in 
post-conviction petition proceedings, is not absolute.  Instead, a court may weigh 
factors, such as its interest in the efficient resolution of cases, in determining 
whether to permit a post-conviction petitioner to discharge counsel.  See, e.g., 
Lovin v. State, 286 S.W.3d 275, 286 (Tenn. 2009)  (“When a prisoner desires to 
                                            
2 For this proposition, Anderson cites Weston v. Gritman Mem’l Hosp., 99 Idaho 
717, 720, 587 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1978) and Idaho State Bar Ass’n v. Idaho Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 102 Idaho 672, 676, 637 P.2d 1168, 1172 (1981).  (Appellant’s 
brief, p.9.)  In both of these cases, the Idaho Supreme Court noted, in dicta, that 
an individual has an “inherent” right to represent himself, but that this right did not 
extend to the representation of other entities.  The Idaho Supreme Court did not 




discharge a retained lawyer [in a post-conviction proceeding], the appropriate 
focus is on balancing the prisoner’s right to discharge his or her lawyer against 
the court’s obligation to administer justice efficiently by avoiding unreasonable 
delay.” (citations omitted)).   
Therefore, as Anderson ultimately acknowledges on appeal (see generally 
Appellant’s brief), it is a matter left to the district court’s discretion whether to 
permit a post-conviction petitioner to discharge his appointed counsel and 
proceed pro se.  In this case, Anderson has failed to demonstrate that the district 
court abused its discretion in denying his motions because he failed to show any 
valid basis for discharging his appointed counsel and subjecting the post-
conviction proceeding to additional delay.  
First, Anderson’s requests were untimely.  Even in the context of the 
established constitutional right of self-representation at a criminal trial, a court 
may consider the timeliness of the request for self-representation in determining 
whether to grant the request.  See State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 P.3d 
512, 523 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 737, 742–743 
(7th Cir. 1991); Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989); Raulerson 
v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 808 (11th Cir. 1984)).  In this case, Anderson did 
not request that he be permitted to represent himself until approximately six 
months after the court granted his motion for appointment of counsel (R., pp.27-
28), approximately two and one-half months after the court entered its notice of 
intent to summarily dismiss the petition (R., pp.80-91), and only after Anderson’s 
appointed counsel requested, and was granted, two extensions of time to 
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respond to the court’s notice (R., pp.92-96, 99-103). The district court 
appropriately considered the late timing of Anderson’s request (Tr., p.3, Ls.11-13; 
p.4, L.3), and acted within its discretion to prevent further delays.    
Further, as the court also noted (Tr., p.4, Ls.1-3), Anderson’s requests 
were not supported by any evidence or assertions that warranted the case being 
delayed further.  Anderson did not explain what evidence he would have been 
able to obtain, as an in-custody pro se inmate, if only he had more time to do so, 
or how such evidence would have cured the defects in his post-conviction 
petition.  (See R., pp.104-105.)  Anderson likewise failed to allege or 
demonstrate that his attorney’s representations to the court about the 
fruitlessness of the investigation were incorrect.  (See id.)  Anderson was not 
automatically entitled to discharge his counsel and proceed pro se just because 
he was apparently not pleased with his counsel’s conclusions.    
Finally, as the district court also correctly recognized (Tr., p.4, Ls.4-6), 
Anderson’s assertion that his post-conviction counsel provided ineffective 
assistance could not provide a valid basis to discharge counsel and continue the 
case in these circumstances because there is no constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.  See Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 
389, 391, 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2014).  
In the alternative, even if the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
permit Anderson to discharge his appointed counsel, such error is harmless 
because the court, as discussed above, acted well within its discretion in denying 
Anderson’s motion for a continuance.  See I.R.C.P. 61 (“the court must disregard 
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any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties.”)  In this case, even if Anderson had the right to discharge his 
counsel, his post-conviction petition would still have been summarily dismissed 
after the district court denied the motion to continue the case.  Therefore, 
Anderson cannot demonstrate prejudice.      
For the foregoing reasons, Anderson has failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion by denying his motions for a third extension of time to 
respond to the notice of intent to dismiss, to discharge his counsel, and to 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order denying Anderson’s pro se motions, and its order summarily dismissing 
Anderson’s post-conviction petition.   
 DATED this 13th day of October, 2016. 
 
       
 __/s/ Mark W. Olson____ 
 MARK W. OLSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of October, 2016, served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 BEN P. McGREEVY 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      _/s/ Mark W. Olson______ 
      MARK W. OLSON 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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